Abstract Advances in neuroscience have implications for criminal law as well as civil and regulatory law, including health, disability, and benefit law. The role of the behavioral and brain sciences in health insurance claims, the mental health parity debate, and disability proceedings is examined.
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Three prefatory notes are in order. First, I will be focusing on the impact of neuroscience for issues in American health law and policy, with which I am familiar. I hope to examine the impact of neuroscience on other countries' health, disability, and benefit structures in the future. Second, the field of health law is extraordinarily broad and rapidly changing. 12 Here, I select just a few examples that I think are illustrative, although not exhaustive, of the ways in which stakeholders currently are using neuroscience to impact health law and policy. I hope that readers with background in health law and policy will identify additional, relevant settings in which neurosciencebased arguments may be raised and will question whether such arguments should work in these settings.
Third, I use the phrase "mental disorders" to refer to clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndromes or patterns that occur in individuals and that are associated with present distress or disability or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. Unfortunately, my and other definitions do not adequately specify precise boundaries for the concept of mental disorder. In addition, they imply a distinction between the "mental" and "physical" that may not exist. I present this definition here simply because it is as useful as any other and may help guide distinctions between normality and pathology.
Mental Disorder Statistics
This essay involves the use of neuroscience in civil and administrative proceedings involving Americans with mental disorders. Mental disorders are common in the U.S. and abroad. 13 According to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), an estimated or 57.5 million American adults suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.
14 Approximately one in seventeen American adults suffer from a serious mental illness. 15 And, an estimated 45% of American adults who have one diagnosable mental disorder meet criteria for at least one more diagnosable mental disorder. 16 Historically, individuals with mental disorders were treated with contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps due to the belief that mental disorders stemmed from parental misdeeds, demonic possession, or deficient character. 17 Mental disorders remain poorly understood today. 18 The National Mental Health Association, recently renamed Mental Health America (MHA), estimates that 71% of Americans still believe that mental disorders are caused by mental weakness, 65% believe that mental disorders are the product of poor parenting, and 35% believe that mental disorders are a form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior. 19 Many stakeholders believe that the stigma against mental disorders plays a role in their lack of funding for research, their lack of parity in public and private health insurance coverage, and their lack of available and reimbursable treatments. 20 Four sets of mental disorders, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, drug and alcohol dependence, and anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to illustrate these claims. Scientists have conducted hundreds of structural and functional neuroimaging studies investigating these conditions. 21 A careful review of these studies reveals many findings as well as many discrepancies and contradictions. 'Y 349, 368 (2001) ("Some diseases are more politically 'in' than others. We all know the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the more patient-protection legislation. My guess is that if AIDS rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate cancer is a 6 … Yes, you guessed it. I am unable to assign a number to the mental health category. If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, the category is close the bottom of the food chain."); id. at 371 ("Contrary to lingering public perception, mental illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing. One thing is certain. The stigma associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in health care coverage."); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. EV. 361, 361 (1998) ("The stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it has prevented policymakers from providing it."); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. EV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (daily ed. Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator Wellstone)) ("The stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it has prevented policymakers from providing it. And for too long, persons in need of mental health services who reach private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped into Government-funded programs.").
these conditions are anatomically, cognitively, and/or chemically "different" when compared to the brains of healthy controls. 23 In the past twenty years, stakeholders have referenced these findings in an attempt to influence health law and policy, especially the scope of private and public health insurance benefits.
The Scope of Health Insurance Benefits
Most Americans with private health insurance receive coverage through their employers as a benefit of employment.
24 When employers first began offering health insurance benefits, 25 covered employees generally had access to physical and mental health benefits under the same terms and conditions. 26 Beginning in the 1970s, many employers reduced their mental health benefits, which were thought to be more expensive than physical health benefits. 27 The Jackson Hole Group, an influential body of health care executives and policy analysts, even recommended that employers limit their mental health benefits to twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days each year.
28 Some employers also increased deductibles and lowered lifetime and daily limits applicable to mental health care.
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These benefit package changes resulted in a disparity between the private insurance coverage that was provided for employees' physical illnesses and mental disorders. 30 Health insurance plans that covered 365 days of inpatient care for physical illnesses might cover only 45 days of inpatient care for mental disorders. 31 Plans that provided unlimited outpatient visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow only 20 outpatient visits for treatment of mental disorders. 32 And plans that contained a $1 million lifetime cap for treatment of physical illnesses might contain only a $50,000 lifetime cap for treatment of mental disorders. 33 These coverage disparities adversely affected individuals with mental disorders. Many individuals with disabling bipolar disorder and severe anorexia nervosa were forced to discontinue their inpatient and outpatient treatments when they had reached their mental health benefit caps. 34 The lack of treatment exacerbated underlying illnesses and symp- 81, 81 (1999). toms, sometimes leading to unemployment, homelessness, incarceration, and premature death.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some patients who were denied additional mental health benefits sued their insurers, arguing that their conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered under the "better" set of benefits.
36 In these contractbased lawsuits, the plaintiffs' experts routinely referenced advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to support their testimony. In a 1987 case out of Arkansas, for example, an insured father sued Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) when it denied additional benefits to his dependent daughter, who had a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder. 37 The BCBS plan at issue provided liberal benefits for hospitalization and medical treatment for physical illnesses and accidental injuries, but only limited benefits for "mental, psychiatric, and nervous conditions," which the plan did not define. 38 At trial, the father called three psychiatrists and two clinical psychologists to testify that bipolar disorder is a physical disease of the brain. 39 The experts referenced advances in "medical research" to support their testimony that bipolar affective disorder is an illness of the brain that stems from physical and biological causes. 40 The court ultimately agreed that the daughter's illness was a physical condition within the meaning of the BCBS plan, 41 but the victory was short-lived. 42 Following the decision, BCBS re-wrote its Arkansas policy and clarified that the coverage limitation for psychiatric conditions applied whether the condition was "'organic or non-organic, whether of biological, non-biological, chemical or non-chemical origin, and irrespective of cause, basis or inducement. '" 43 Some courts focus not on the origin of the plaintiff's condition but on the ways in which the plaintiff's condition manifests itself. In a 1989 case out of California, a plaintiff who became totally disabled as a result of his bipolar disorder sued his insurance company for both long-term disability benefits and medical benefits. 44 The long-term disability plan expressly excluded coverage for "mental and nervous disorders." 45 The medical plan stated that it would pay only 50% of physician charges for "mental and/or nervous treatment," which the plan defined as "treatment for a neurosis, psycho-neurosis, psychopathy, psychosis, or mental or nervous disease or disorder of any kind."
46 At trial, the plaintiff called an expert witness who testified that the plaintiff's disorder was an organic disease caused by a chemical imbalance and other physiological disease processes. 47 The court, taking judicial notice of the then-current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which listed bipolar disorder as a mental disorder, 48 disagreed, stating that the test was whether the manifestation, not the origin, of the disorder was mental or physical in nature. 49 Because the plaintiff's disorder manifested itself in very high moods and very low moods, the court classified his disorder as a mental disorder. 50 In 1990, the Eighth Circuit also focused on symptoms, reasoning that most laypersons understand 38 Id. at 430. 39 Id. at 430-31. 40 Id. at 431 ("Dr. Thomas Harris, a treating psychiatrist... stated it is in fact a physical disorder. 'The medical research is now, in my opinion, overwhelming in that regard.' He stated that it was an illness of the brain and body rather than of the mind and stemmed from a chemical imbalance which responds to medication. This illness, like many others he described, manifest some behavioral or emotional disturbances, but the causes of those manifestations are physical and biological in nature as distinguished from mental."). 41 Id. at 432. 42 Shannon, supra note 20, at 76. 35 See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Parity 834-35 (1989) . 45 Id. at 835. 46 Id. 47 Id. at 839-40. 48 Id. at 840. 49 Id. ("Every reasonable layman would view a person manifesting such derangement as suffering from a mental disease. The policies here in question exclude all mental disease from coverage… regardless of whether the disability was caused by a chemical imbalance, a blow on the head, being frightened by a black cat, inability to cope or whatever.... In the disability policy, mental disorders are expressly "not covered." Period…. Manifestation, not cause, is the yardstick."). 50 illnesses in terms of their symptoms, not their origin. In the Eighth Circuit case, an insured father sued Lincoln National Life Insurance Company when it denied additional benefits to his dependent son, who had an affective mood disorder that manifested itself in a sharp decline in grades, repeated incidents of lying, mood swings, and aberrant behavior in and out of school. 51 One of the applicable insurance plans limited coverage for hospital charges associated with "mental illness(es), functional nervous disorder(s)… or for psychiatric or psychoanalytic care." 52 A second applicable plan limited coverage for the care of "mental illness(es)."
53 Neither plan defined mental illness.
54 At trial, the father called three physicians of various specialties to testify that "mounting evidence suggest [s] that affective mood disorder is genetically or biologically caused."
55 Notwithstanding, the Eighth Circuit found that the son's affective mood disorder was a mental illness subject to the more limited coverage because symptoms, not origin, mattered, and because most laypersons would agree that the symptoms of affective mood disorder are behavioral, rather than physical, in nature. 56 Other American courts have adhered to the same layperson standard en route to ruling in favor of the insurer. 57 Finally, in a pair of decisions issued in 2006 and 2007 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia addressed several questions relating to the insurance coverage of bipolar disorder. The issue before the District Court in the 2006 decision was whether bipolar disorder, if proved by the patient, would be subject to the mental illness cap set forth in the defendant's disability insurance policy. 58 The plaintiff called a physician to testify that bipolar disorder is a neurobiological disorder that affects the physical and chemical structures of the brain. 59 The insurer, on the other hand, contended that bipolar disorder is a mental illness subject to the lower benefit caps because bipolar disorder is included within the DSM-IV's classification of mental disorders 60 (even though the DSM-IV acknowledges that no good distinction between physical and mental disorders exists 61 ). definition of mental illness against the insurer and held that bipolar disorder was covered under the better set of benefits.
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The issue before the District Court in the 2007 opinion was whether the plaintiff actually had bipolar disorder. 63 The insurer first contended that the plaintiff did not have bipolar disorder beacuse no brain scans showed any changes in the plaintiff's brain; then, the insurer conceded that brain scans cannot yet diagnose bipolar disorder.
64 Lawyers frequently make strong arguments followed by concessions and engage in alternative argumentation. This kind of zealous advocacy may confuse the court because it first validates and then invalidates the underlying neuroimaging technology. In the end, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
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Since the time of these cases Congress and many State legislatures have passed laws that require some health insurance plans to provide some parity in their coverage of physical and mental health conditions. For those health insurance plans that are not regulated by a federal or state parity law, including public programs such as the Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 66 and for regulated insurance plans based in states with incomplete parity laws, the outcome of a plaintiff's case against the insurer for the better set of benefits will depend on whether and how the plan defines mental disorder and how the court interprets either the definition or the undefined phrase.
One question is whether and how advances in neuroscience, including structural and functional neuroimaging, will impact the scope of insurance coverage disputes. Based on litigants' liberal use of psychiatric, psychological, and neuroimaging evidence to support brain-based claims starting in the late 1980s, as well as stakeholders' use of neuroimaging evidence in mental health parity debates and disability claim proceedings, as discussed in more detail below, I would anticipate plaintiffs' continued use of the behavioral and brain sciences to argue that certain mental disorders are biological in nature and, therefore, deserving of benefits applicable to physical illnesses. Given decisions in cases such as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 67 which found that bipolar disorder was an illness of the brain that stemmed from physical and biological causes, 68 I also anticipate that plaintiffs' neuroscience-based claims may have some success in jurisdictions that look to the cause or origin of the plaintiff's disorder, especially if the disorder is one of the better known DSM-IV axis 1 clinical disorders (such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder), or axis 3 general medical conditions that plays a role in the development, continuance, or exacerbation of an axis 1 or 2 disorder (such as a brain injury or AIDS that can result in symptoms of mental illness).
In cases involving other mental disorders, I suspect that the outcome will depend on whether that jurisdiction focuses on origin, treatment, manifestation, or symptoms, 69 as well as whether the "first impression" symptoms are physical (e.g., starvation and dehydration symptoms of an eating disorder) or behavioral (e.g., delusions and hallucinations associated with schizophrenia) and, if behavioral, the ability of the plaintiff's experts to convince the jury that such behavior is brain-based. Given the ready (Internet) availability of neuroimaging studies finding that emotion may be correlated with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) activity in the limbic 66 See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 34, at 622 (discussing the nonapplication of many state parity laws to public health insurance programs); TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAID DISCRIM-INATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact12. htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) ("While the federal government seeks 'parity' for treatment of lesser forms of mental illness by private insurers, it continues to discriminate against those with severe mental illnesses by denying them coverage under Medicaid when they require hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital."). 74 and so on, 75 I do anticipate that aggressive plaintiffs may try to argue the brain-basis of the many signs and symptoms of mental illness, including those relating to emotion (e.g., depression, mania, anxiety and flat affect), consciousness (e.g., decreased attention span, disorientation, and delirium), motor behavior (e.g., underactivity, overactivity, and compulsive movements), perception (e.g., auditory and visual hallucinations and other distortions of real events), long-and short-term memory impairments, speech, insight, and thinking (including thoughts of persecution or Apocryphal doom).
76 I also anticipate that defendant insurers may respond by arguing either that mental disorders cannot yet be diagnosed by a brain scan or that the plaintiff failed to introduce a brain scan that would have provided objective evidence of a mental disorder.
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How should we assess these neuroscience-based claims? Scholars already have laid the groundwork for evaluating claims made about fMRI-lie detectors in terms of meeting relevance and reliability requirements set forth in civil and criminal rules of evidence.
78 In scope-of-insurance lawsuits involving functional neuroimaging evidence, litigants very well may have similar evidentiary defenses based on many of the same relevancy and reliability problems. These include underlying problems with the theory of neurovascular coupling, the time lag associated with blood flow, the localization of neuronal activity, the statistical averaging of images, paired image subtraction, subject selection, the number of subjects and implications for statistical significance, as well as broader philosophical concerns relating to the inherent sociocultural and historical subjectivity of diagnosing and classifying psychiatric conditions. 79 A review of structural and functional neuroimaging studies involving individuals with mental disorders reveals several additional limitations, including the effect that different psychotropic drug regimens, alcohol and illegal drug use cigarette smoking, endocrine changes, nutrition differences, and activity levels have for study results, as well as the extent to which the duration and severity of the subjects' mental illnesses may have contributed to the magnitude of any structural changes or functional differences identified during the study. 80 Stephen Hyman, former Director of the NIMH, referenced several neuroimaging studies when he told Congress in 1996 that mental disorders are diseases of the brain:
[T]he accumulating weight of the evidence and the great bulk of it resulting from NIMHsponsored research demonstrates that mental disorders are brain diseases…. We know that individuals with schizophrenia have abnormalities in the size of their cerebral ventricles, those fluidfilled cavities in the brain; simply put, in schizophrenia, we see irregularities in the ratio of brain tissue to fluid in the brain. NIMH-sponsored research also has provided compelling evidence that the connections of nerve cells in the brain, the circuits that underlie the processing of thoughts and emotions, do not develop or function normally in patients with schizophrenia… [Current] scientific techniques demonstrate beyond doubt that schizophrenia is a primary brain disorder." 88 83 Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153-154 ("[L] aypersons are inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless of their cause…"). 82 See, e.g., William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical Necessity, 22(7) PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 362 (1992) (discussing insurers' application of the medical necessity requirement in the context of reimbursement for treatment of psychiatric conditions; identifying key factors that underlie the concept of medical necessity in psychiatric practice); Nancy W. Miller, What Is Medical Necessity?, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST (Aug. 2002) ("[There are] as many definitions of medical necessity as there are payors, laws, and courts to interpret them. Generally speaking, though, most definitions incorporate the principle of providing services which are 'reasonable and necessary' or 'appropriate' in light of clinical standards of practice…. Medicare defines 'medical necessity' as services or items reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member. While that sounds like a hard and fast rule, consider that CMS (formerly HCFA) has the power under the Social Security Act to determine if the method of treating a patient in the particular case is reasonable and necessary on a case-by-case basis."); Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 5 (examining medical necessity in the context of mental health care). 81 See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(C)(2) (allowing insurers to opt out of parity if parity raises overall plan costs by more than one percent); Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a (e) (1) and (2) (Sept. 19, 2007) (exempting from parity group health plans "whose compliance would increase total costs by more than 2% during the first year or by more than 1% each subsequent year"). In 1999, Surgeon General David Satcher released an influential report in which he referenced research in basic neuroscience, behavioral science, and behavioral genetics to support the characterization of mental disorders as "real health conditions" for which "a range of treatments exist." 89 And, since 1999, the public has been overwhelmed with television, print, radio, and electronic news regarding advances in neuroimaging, neurointerventions, and the behavioral and brain sciences.
90 "An endless stream of news stories about the latest advances in brain scans and the chemical conquest of personality enhances the experts' credibility and feeds into a belief that we have come to a sophisticated understanding of the intersection between mind, brain, and behavior."
91 As the public continues to receive this information, I suspect the application of the reasonable layperson test in health insurance coverage disputes may begin to swing in favor of plaintiffs who claim that their mental disorders are physical in nature.
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The Mental Health Parity Debate
In the early 1990s, many stakeholders began to lobby Congress and State legislatures for health insurance parity, reasoning that there is no biological justification for the unequal insurance coverage of mental and physical conditions by health insurance plans.
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Insurers responded with a multi-layered cost-containment defense. By limiting mental health coverage, insurers claimed they could reduce costs, maintain premium levels, and cover more individuals. 94 Insurers also claimed that increased mental health benefits would give rise to adverse selection (that is, that consumers with mental health conditions that required expensive treatments would select those plans that provided coverage for such treatments).
95 Insurers also expressed concern that consumers' demand for mental health treatment would be highly responsive to the presence of insurance coverage 96 and that consumers would seek treatment and reimbursement for "frivolous" emotional conditions and other mental disorders characterized by diagnostic ambiguity and uncertain treatment success. 97 The Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey opposed legislative efforts to expand mental health benefits in the State of New Jersey for fear that the legislation "would uncover unworthy disorders such as shyness, boastfulness, fetishism, and impulsiveness."
98 The New Jersey Business and Industry Association similarly worried that the legislation would require insurers to cover less serious mental disorders listed in the DSM-IV, including "sibling relational problems and caffeine addiction."
99 Stakeholders in favor of 91 Doherty, supra note 75.
92 Shannon, supra note 20, at 75. 93 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 99 ("Nowhere is the gap between science and society more pronounced than in health benefit coverage for mental illness."); LaFratta, supra note 17, at 406 (same); Kaplan, supra note 26, at 328 (same). 94 See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 35, at 186 ("Resistance to such legislation centers on concerns over cost, diagnostic and prognostic indeterminacy, and ambiguity at the line dividing medical from non-medical treatments important to the seriously mentally ill. Congress declared the 1990s the Decade of the Brain. In this decade we have learned much through research-in basic neuroscience, behavioral science, and genetics-about the complex workings of the brain. Research can help us gain a further understanding of the fundamental mechanisms underlying thought, emotion, and behavior-and an understanding of what goes wrong in the brain in mental illness. It can also lead to better treatments and improved services for our diverse population…."). 99 See id. at 338, n. 98. mental health parity responded by offering evidence that the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders is precise, effective, and successful. 100 By the mid-1990s, proponents of mental health parity had achieved some success at the federal and State level. 101 At the federal level, Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (the 1996 MHPA), which required group health plans offering a mental health benefit in conjunction with medical and surgical benefits to provide equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed within the plan. 102 A regulated group health plan that offered a lifetime cap of $1 million for treatment for physical illnesses, for example, would be required to establish a $1 million cap for treatment of mental disorders. The 1996 MHPA did not require covered health plans to actually offer a mental health benefit, 103 nor did it prohibit covered plans from imposing higher copayments or deductibles for mental health services, different limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, or otherwise establishing different costsharing ratios. 104 Thus, a regulated group health plan could reimburse a patient 100% of the cost of a visit to an orthopedic surgeon, but only 50% of the cost of a visit to a psychiatrist. 105 Mental health parity continues to be an issue at the federal level. As of early 2008, there are competing versions of a new mental health parity bill in the House of Representatives and the Senate. 106 Some mental health advocates believe that the new legislation, if passed, will represent a substantial improvement over the 1996 MHPA. One Senate version, for example, extended the federal parity mandate to deductibles, coinsurance, and the number of visits each year. 107 This Senate version did not require regulated group health plans to offer a mental health benefit 108 and it also contained an exemption for group health plans whose compliance would increase total costs by more than two percent during the first year or by more than one percent each subsequent year. 109 Many State legislatures have enacted their own mental health parity laws, which vary widely in scope. 110 Some of these laws require insurers to offer mental health benefits and to provide full parity between physical and mental health benefits, some laws require insurers to offer optional mental health coverage, some laws require insurers to offer mental health benefits equal to medical health benefits but only if mental health benefits are offered, some laws require a minimum level of coverage for mental health benefits, and some laws contain yet other variations.
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One question is whether advances in neuroscience will impact mental health parity interpretations or applications at the federal or State level. I think they may in at least two different ways. The first way relates to the way in which litigants or courts interpret the mental health benefits that are subject to the applicable parity mandate. Many State laws contain specific descriptions of the mental health benefits that are subject to the State's parity mandate. 112 Connecticut, for example, mandates insurance coverage for most conditions listed in the DSM-IV. 113 Montana mandates parity for seven disorders: schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and autism. 114 New Jersey mandates insurance coverage for "a mental or nervous condition that is caused by a biological disorder of the brain and results in a clinically significant or psychological syndrome or pattern that substantially limits the functioning of the person with the illness, including, but not limited to, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, paranoia and other psychotic disorders, obsessivecompulsive disorder, panic disorder and pervasive developmental disorder or autism."
115 Nebraska expressly ties its current definition of serious mental illness to the state of medical science: "any mental health condition that current medical science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the brain and that substantially limits the life activities of the person with the serious mental illness…." 116 Many scholars also urge the adoption of mental disorder definitions that are tied to the current state of medical science: "Congress should pass legislation requiring full parity between certain biologically based mental illnesses and physical illnesses. Such a bill should include a very small list of disorders with the clearest scientific backing for their biological bases….
[I]t would be relatively simple matter to amend the law in the future to add any other diagnoses that achieve wide scientific recognition as a biologically based brain disorder." 117 Given litigants' liberal use of expert psychiatric, psychological, and neuroimaging evidence to support brain-based claims starting in the late 1980s, I suspect that in States such as New Jersey that mandate insurance coverage for "a mental or nervous condition that is caused by a biological disorder of the brain" or in States such as Nebraska that expressly define protected mental health benefits in terms of whether "current medical science affirms [that the disorder] is caused by a biological disorder of the brain," 118 aggressive plaintiffs may use structural and functional neuroimaging studies in an attempt to establish a biological basis for their conditions, the treatment of which would then be subject to the State's parity mandate. Note that any neuroscience-based evidence would not necessarily be sufficient for the plaintiff; in some states, she still would be required to prove that her mental disorder substantially limits her functioning, which may require additional medical or social evidence regarding her inability to work or complete other activities of daily living. 119 extra mental disorders regardless of the merit of plaintiffs' neuroscience-based claims. A second way in which advances in neuroimaging may impact mental health parity law is to provide support for the passage of parity legislation in states that do not have such legislation or support for more stringent parity legislation at the federal or State level. When the Texas Legislature was considering a mental health parity bill in 1991, Senator Mike Moncrief (DFort Worth), the bill's sponsor, wanted the Texas Legislature to understand why he was concerned about insurers' willingness to cover treatments for neurological disorders such as Parkinson's disease but not mental disorders such as schizophrenia.
123 Senator Moncrief told the Legislature that the disparate treatment was illogical because both conditions involve an imbalance of the same chemical: "'[The] chemical factor in the brain involved in both of these diseases is the same; it's dopamine. One disease involves an overabundance of dopamine while the other is a shortage of the identical neurotransmitter.'" 124 I anticipate that proponents of mental health parity legislation will continue to use neuroscience to illustrate what they perceive to be illogical or unjust coverage discrepancies. 125 In a 2004 essay published in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.) argued that, "In the face of a growing body of scientific literature documenting the biochemical nature of mental illnesses, the status quo of insurance discrimination against those who suffer from such illnesses is indefensible."
126 Kennedy cited three NIMH research summaries noting that NIMH investigators had discovered "specific, subtle abnormalities in the structure and function of the brains of patients with schizophrenia," that "one of the most consistent findings to date has been the appearance of specific abnormalities, or lesions, in the white matter of the brain in patients with bipolar disorder," and that "animal research suggests that "different anxiety disorders may be associated with activation in different parts of the amygdala." 127 Kennedy concluded: "In an era where researchers are churning out even more science exploring the biochemical and physiological causes and effects of mental illnesses, there is no excuse for such differential treatment."
128 Kennedy is the lead sponsor of the House version of the mental health parity bill currently before Congress.
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The Distribution of Social Security and Other Benefits Stakeholders also are using advances in neuroscience, especially neuroimaging, to impact disputes about the receipt of benefits under public and private disability, social security, and other benefit programs. To prevent healthy plaintiffs from receiving benefits when they do not have a disability, disability plans and programs tend to define disability in terms of an abnormality that is "demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."
130 Medical evidence is the cornerstone of disability status.
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Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), for example, is only available to claimants who can furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of a disability, including "medical signs and findings, established by medially acceptable clinical or labora- 124 Id.
125 Beth Mellen Harrison, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 255, 265 (2002) ("Given these advances in research, there is no scientific justification for treating mental health services differently than general medical services."). 126 Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental Health Care, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 363, 367 (2004) . 127 Id. at 367, n.39. 128 Id. at 374-75. 130 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(3) (2007) (defining disability for purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months... For purposes of this subsection, a 'physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."). 131 See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation under Social Security, BLUE BOOK, at Part II, Evidentiary Requirements (June 2006; amended April 2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/ evidentiary.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) 135 I anticipate that more plaintiffs will attempt to offer neuroimaging evidence of their disabilities, especially in light of the frequency with which claimants already have introduced brain scans in an attempt to prove their disabilities and with which courts already have denied disability claims based on the lack of neuroimaging or other "objective" evidence of a disability.
In 2003, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a district court's decision to affirm the Social Security Commissioner's denial of the plaintiff's claim for SSDI benefits based a number of physical complaints, including fibromyalgia, pain, and chronic fatigue syndrome. 136 The Sixth Circuit quoted the SSA's statutory standard for assessing pain and fatigue, which requires "objective clinical or laboratory manifestations" versus subjective firstperson complaints. 137 Given that no traditional laboratory tests confirm diagnoses such as chronic fatigue syndrome, the SSA stated below that it would allow findings from an "abnormal magnetic resonance imaging MRI brain scan." 138 The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's conclusion that the claimant did not provide sufficient evidence of her disability status because she did not submit sufficient objective evidence of her pain.
139
Neuroscience also is being used to impact disputes about the receipt of benefits under private disability plans. In 2005, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NFL Players Retirement Plan and the NFL Players Supplemental Disability Plan (Plans) in a lawsuit filed by former professional football player Brent Boyd for disability benefits. 140 Boyd claimed that he suffered organic brain problems after he was knocked unconscious in a preseason football game in August 1980 and that his "constant flu-like feeling, fatigue, headaches, queasiness, forgetfulness, intermittent blurred vision, difficulty reading, lack of concentration, learning difficulty, memory loss, and dizziness and lightheadedness" qualified him for total and permanent disability benefits under the Plans. 141 As part of the lawsuit, Boyd was subjected to nearly two days of neuropsychological testing. Some of the physicians agreed with Boyd that his single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) scan showed "decreased brain activity 'consistent with head trauma '" 142 and that he was disabled due to his August 1980 brain injury. 143 Other physicians agreed with the Plans that Boyd's depression, untreated hypertension and physical deconditioning, and not the alleged August 1980 head injury, caused his symptoms.
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In the end, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans. he following findings will be sufficient, although not required, to establish a medically determinable impairment under the Act:... An abnormal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scan…"). 136 Id. at 515.
Based on the Boyd case and a number of other disability cases in which structural and functional brain scans have been ordered, used, or requested, 146 I anticipate that plaintiffs will continue to attempt to introduce both structural and functional neuroimaging evidence in support of their disability claims.
147 How might we assess these claims? Many of the limitations mentioned in the previous sections will apply, but note that the SSA and many private disability plans require disability claimants to be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 148 Courts have found many claimants with traditional mental disorders not protected because they were able to engage in some type of gainful work activity. The burden of establishing disability is on the claimant, and substantial evidence of disability usually is required. 149 Plaintiffs thus may offer neuroimaging evidence of their impairments, but neuroscience likely will not provide evidence of the existence or significance of any work or other social limitation. 150 
Conclusion
American patients, patient advocacy organizations, litigants, lobbyists, legislators, and scholars are relying on advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to characterize structural and functional differences as brain-based health conditions worthy of insurance coverage, statutory parity, and disability benefits. Some of these claims concern me. Consider the insurer who argued that the plaintiff did not have a mental disorder because the plaintiff had not presented any neuroimaging evidence of the disorder but then conceded that neuroimaging cannot yet diagnose mental disorders. 151 This type of argumentation shows the extent to which litigants may be willing to throw into the ring any neuroscience-based claim in the hope that something will stick with the judge or the jury. Although concessions and alternative argumentation are part and parcel of zealous advocacy, they do not help judges, jurors, or litigants obtain a more sophisticated understanding of neuroscience in general or the capability of neuroimaging technologies in particular. One of the reasons I am excited about the emerging neurolaw and neuroethics literature is that judges may read the careful scientific, philosophical, and evidentiary analyses and issue better opinions as a result.
What gives me real cause for pause, though, is the appropriateness of many of the stakeholders' subsequent normative or substantive arguments; that is, that all structural and functional brain differences should be treated as covered or protected conditions for purposes of health, disability, and benefit law. I do think that neuroscience gives stakeholders one additional source of ammunition, perhaps some will refer to it as evidence, in support of the normative argument that mental disorders should be treated like physical illnesses for purposes of health, disability, and benefit law. I also think that advances in neuroscience do give us reason to revisit age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions, such as, "What kinds of mental suffering create legitimate claims from others through public or private health insurance?" 152 But neuroscience does not yet and probably never will answer a range of questions that are more important to the future of American health law and policy. For example, neuroscience does not yet tell us when a particular structural or functional brain differences should be considered a neurological characteristics or adaptation, on the one hand, or evidence of a DSM-IV mental disorder that requires treatment on the other. Neuroscience also does not tell us how we should allocate finite health care dollars among all of the different physical and mental disorders, including the expanding category of biologically based mental disorders. Even with advances in neuroscience, we are still left to weigh the value of knowing that many mental disorders may have a biological component against the cost of providing equal insurance benefits, the cost of expanding the scope of protected status under disability law, and the cost of distributing additional benefits under other legal schemes.
Neuroscience also does not give us a better definition of "medical necessity," which is the key to reimbursement under most public and private health insurance plans in the U.S. Neuroscience does not tell us when a structural or functional difference becomes significant enough such that its treatment should be reimbursed by the Medicare or Medicaid Programs or a private health insurance plan. Neuroscience also does not tell us whether we should take a "hard-line" or "expansive" view of medical necessity. 153 Should our health insurers only reimburse treatments for impairments that significantly interfere with an individual's ability to live and function? Or, should our health insurers reimburse treatments that would enhance healthy individuals' current level of functioning? Stated more broadly, should the U.S. adopt a "normal function model" of health care (in which the target of clinical action is a medically defined deviation and the goal of health care is to decrease the impact of disease or disability), a "capability model" (in which the target of clinical action is an unchosen constraint of personal capability and the goal of health care is to enhance personal capability) or a "welfare model" (in which the target of clinical action is an unchosen constraint of potential for happiness and the goal of health care is to enhance potential for happiness)? 154 Neuroscience, as we all know, raises many new questions about the differences between treatment and enhancement. 155 Even with neuroscience, American health policymakers will continue to struggle with how best to identify health care's goals, define medically necessary care, and determine how much medically necessary care public and private programs should provide. 156 In the meantime, I recommend that lawyers and scholars who work in the areas of health, disability, and benefit law (and not just those who self-identify as neurolawyers or neuroethicists) be mindful of the ways in which stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the formulation and interpretation of such law.
